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Lebanon’s State of Erosion 
Divisions over the Conflict in Syria Sustain a Dangerous Stalemate 
Heiko Wimmen 
The repercussions of the war in Syria have produced a prolonged political stalemate 
in neighboring Lebanon. As the major political blocs in the country are aligned with 
opposing sides in the Syria conflict, fear of spillover has led major actors to avoid 
controversial decisions and suspend elections. This has left room for minimal consen-
sus around maintaining the security that has helped shield Lebanon from the chaos 
next door. But it has also caused the progressive erosion of political legitimacy, which 
threatens to unravel political institutions and lead to the further fragmentation of po-
litical forces. As all sides are tied to external patrons who no longer consider the coun-
try a priority, domestic compromise is likely to remain out of reach. Germany and its 
European partners should step into the void, in particular the one left by the withdrawal 
of Saudi Arabia, and push for parliamentary elections as a first step toward due process. 
 
The Lebanese presidency has been vacant 
since May 24, 2014. Over two and a half 
years, arcane political maneuvering, dra-
matic realignments, as well as discreet and 
not so discreet external intervention have 
failed to yield a candidate who can rally 
sufficient support among the major politi-
cal actors in the Lebanese theater. On Sep-
tember 28, 2016, electoral session number 
45 had to be adjourned due to lack of a 
quorum, once again (Lebanese presidents 
are elected by parliament and require a 
quorum of two-thirds of the legislators). 
On the one hand, the stalemate is the 
result of the principle of power-sharing 
between sectarian groups (of which 18 are 
officially recognized) that has structured 
Lebanese politics since the establishment 
of the state. Because this system requires 
broadly inclusive coalitions in order to 
function, lengthy and cumbersome pro-
cesses of bargaining over public offices 
and resources have always been a staple of 
Lebanese politics. The propensity of Leba-
nese politicians to look for external allies, 
on the other hand, has always left Lebanon 
receptive to the intervention of external 
powers, who would shore up local clients 
to keep the minuscule – but strategically 
located – country aligned with their 
broader interests. 
Because the regional cold war between 
Iran and Saudi Arabia has evolved into 
open (proxy) warfare in neighboring Syria 
and in Yemen, the ties that connect major 
Lebanese actors to these regional powers 
SWP Comments 46 
October 2016 
2 
have led to debilitating polarization, and 
almost the total paralysis of Lebanon’s 
political institutions. The presidential void 
is therefore only the most visible expression 
of a process of progressive state failure. This 
comes at a time when Lebanon is facing 
challenges that already overwhelm those 
institutions still functioning. 
Struggle over Symbols 
On the surface, the pitched battle over 
the presidency is oddly mismatched to the 
rather modest prerogatives of the office 
itself. Following the Taif Peace Accord of 
1989, which ended the 1975–1990 civil war, 
the extensive authority wielded by Lebanese 
presidents was reduced to a largely ceremo-
nial role. The struggle over who is to become 
Lebanese president is therefore less about 
a position with real political power than a 
symbolic one. Yet, symbols matter as much 
as substance in Lebanese politics. 
Political custom reserves each of the 
three top executive positions for one of 
the largest sectarian groups in the country, 
with the presidency going to a Maronite 
Christian. The prerogatives of these offices 
are, in turn, seen as being indicative of the 
balance of power between these groups. 
Hence, the demotion of the President of the 
Republic, as stipulated by the 1990 consti-
tution, stood for the end of Maronite-Chris-
tian supremacy, which had characterized 
pre-civil war Lebanon, just as the upgrading 
of the (Sunni) prime minister and the 
(Shiite) Speaker of Parliament reflected the 
(demographic and political) ascendance of 
the two largest Muslim communities. 
This post-Taif power balance is precisely 
what the current main contender for the 
post – the former army general Michel 
Aoun – is proposing to reverse. It is thought 
that securing the presidency for the leader 
of the strongest Christian party (with 18 out 
of 128 seats in parliament, Aoun’s Free 
Patriotic Movement comes second after the 
Sunni Future Movement) would endow the 
officeholder with real leverage over legis-
lation and nominations, thus putting the 
holder of the highest (Christian) office on 
a more even footing with his Sunni and 
Shiite counterparts. 
In reality, the consequences of such a 
rebalancing of sectarian power relations 
are likely to be minimal: An array of insti-
tutional checks and veto rights – in addi-
tion to non-formal and customary arrange-
ments – leave very limited room for actual 
change, even if the bargaining power of one 
party were to increase considerably. Yet, the 
urgency of Lebanon’s dwindling Christian 
population to obtain some assurances about 
its presence in the country – at a time when 
Christian communities are under threat 
across the region and radical Islamism ap-
pears to be on the rise – is strong enough 
to provide Aoun with consistent electoral 
support, despite his highly controversial 
alliance with the Shiite party-cum-militia 
Hizbullah. 
From Confrontation to Stalemate 
Elections in Lebanon, however, are never 
exclusively – and often not even mainly – 
about the Lebanese. On many occasions, 
they became the stage where external 
powers attempted to score (again, mostly 
symbolic) advantages in pursuit of their 
larger regional agendas. 
Over the past decade, the country has 
been a political proxy battleground for the 
regional competition between Syria and 
Iran on one side, and Saudi Arabia and the 
United States on the other. In particular 
after the war of 2006, when Hizbullah’s 
well-prepared guerrilla forces inflicted 
unexpected losses on Israel’s over-confident 
military, rolling back the organization’s 
autonomous military capacities became a 
priority for the US administration of George 
W. Bush. Saudi Arabia and other Arab allies 
of the United States, in turn, became in-
creasingly concerned about Iranian power 
projections by means of the party. Streng-
thening the coercive capacity of the Leba-
nese state (in particular the Internal Secu-
rity Forces, ISF) and propping up the pro-
Western parties aligned in the so-called 
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March 14 Alliance were the two key compo-
nents of their strategy to domesticate the 
party and force it into the institutional fold. 
As the March 8 Alliance formed around 
Hizbullah (both alliances take their names 
from rival demonstrations that occurred in 
the spring of 2005) pushed back, political 
paralysis ensued, including a presidential 
vacuum that lasted for about six months. 
The pitched political battle escalated 
to actual violence in May 2008. As became 
abundantly clear then, Hizbullah had the 
means, the determination, and the solid 
support of its external allies to resort to 
violence; the pro-Western parties had nei-
ther. Beirut was occupied by militias, and 
the government faltered within two days. 
Despite the “national reconciliation con-
ference” in the Qatari capital, Doha, which 
resolved the immediate conflict (on Hiz-
bullah’s terms), the shadow of the mini-civil 
war of 2008 has been hanging over Leba-
nese politics ever since. Fear of escalating 
violence, which only intensified as the 
conflict in neighboring Syria heated up in 
early 2012, has prompted the main political 
forces to avoid or postpone any political con-
frontations or decisions that could poten-
tially jeopardize the status quo. 
Compromises, on the other hand, con-
tinue to be equally unattainable as long as 
the war in Syria continues. Since all Leba-
nese parties expected (and still expect) that 
the outcome of the conflict would have a 
direct impact on the political balance of 
power in Lebanon, no one is prepared to 
yield or accept what may turn out to have 
been too much or too little. Their foreign 
patrons, in turn, were – and still are – far 
too preoccupied with Syria to invest politi-
cal capital in what has become a mere 
sideshow since 2012. After the short-lived 
attempt at reviving the political institu-
tions inaugurated by the Doha conference, 
the same lines of division that had caused 
the violence in 2008 emerged again, this 
time in the form of a stalemate that has 
persisted until today. 
The first casualty was the government of 
Prime Minister Najib Mikati, who resigned 
in March 2013 over contested appointments 
in the security sector and disagreement 
over the upcoming parliamentary elections. 
His designated successor, Tammam Salam, 
remained unable to form a new cabinet, 
leaving Mikati to run the country with a 
caretaker government and reduced com-
petences. By late spring of 2013, parliament 
divined to suspend elections and extend its 
own term. Security concerns were cited to 
justify the constitutionally questionable 
maneuver, yet parliament remained para-
lyzed by multiple boycotts that prevented a 
quorum. Only in March 2014 was a new all-
party government finally patched together 
so that the looming presidential vacuum 
would not lead to a complete institutional 
breakdown. It has since been crippled by 
resignations and the insistence by some 
parties that decisions must be taken in con-
sensus. Parliament granted itself yet an-
other extension in November 2014, further 
undermining its own legitimacy, and with 
it that of the government. In June 2017, its 
twice-extended term will expire once more, 
with few indicators that the political rivals 
are prepared to hold the ballot this time 
around. 
This near breakdown of the political 
institutions has become the source of mul-
tiple governance failures. Most problem-
atically, appointments in the ISF and the 
Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have become 
the object of protracted tugs-of-war, threat-
ening to undermine their credibility as 
national institutions beyond the political 
and sectarian fray as well as their capacity 
to mount a coherent security response to 
the challenges of the conflict next door. 
After years of bargaining over the spoils of 
Lebanon’s coastal gas fields and the privati-
zation of the electricity sector, daily power 
cuts continue, and gas exploration has not 
even started. In 2015, the failure to renego-
tiate lucrative service contracts led to a col-
lapse of the waste disposal system, causing 
massive public protest. The growing exas-
peration of the public became apparent in 
the municipal elections held in May 2016. 
Local lists campaigning on platforms to 
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wrest control over municipal councils – 
and their sometimes significant budgets 
and patronage potential – from the politi-
cal elites did well in localities conventionally 
considered to be under the safe control 
of the big political blocs. These local lists, 
however, remained locked out of the repre-
sentative institutions by the majority (first-
past-the-post) electoral system that applies 
in Lebanon. 
Saudi Arabia’s Shifting Strategies 
Since 2015, this stalemate has been rattled 
by the increasingly assertive turn in Saudi 
foreign policy. Up to then, Saudi Arabia had 
encouraged its main Lebanese client, the 
Sunni Future Movement, led by the Hariri 
family, to adopt an accommodating posi-
tion vis-à-vis the uncompromising stances of 
Hizbullah and its ally Syria. This strategy 
of accommodation – which some parts of 
the movement now criticize as appease-
ment – was part of a larger attempt by 
Saudi Arabia’s late King Abdallah to bring 
Syria back into the Arab fold and wean 
Damascus off its close alliance with Iran. 
Despite winning a majority at the polls in 
2009, Future leader Saad Hariri went more 
than the extra mile to form yet another 
“government of national unity.” In the pro-
cess, he once more confirmed Hizbullah’s 
right to maintain the arms it had just used 
against the government that his party had 
headed. As prime minister, he went hat in 
hand to Damascus to make peace with the 
very regime he held responsible for the 
murder of his father in 2005. And while 
remaining rhetorically committed to the 
international tribunal set up to investigate 
this and other assassinations, Hariri kept 
Hizbullah in government, even as the in-
vestigation zoned in on a core group of 
suspects among Hizbullah’s leading cadres. 
When Hizbullah finally walked out by itself 
in early 2011 and subsequently formed a 
new cabinet exclusively with its own allies, 
Future calmed street protests by its sup-
porters, as it did in October 2012, when a 
high-level intelligence officer considered 
especially close to the movement was assas-
sinated. Despite consistent rumors about 
links to jihadi networks, the Hariri party 
also provided critical political cover for an 
operation of the LAF against a militant anti-
Hizbullah cleric in Hariri’s hometown, Saida, 
in the summer of 2013. It disowned – if 
somewhat belatedly – radical elements who 
appeared to facilitate recruitment and arms 
supplies for jihadis fighting in Syria and 
helped control the situation in Tripoli, after 
multiple rounds of fighting between Sunni 
and Alawi quarters, who support opposing 
sides in the Syrian civil war. 
Yet, the Saudi position shifted decisively 
when the current King of Saudi Arabia, 
King Salman, ascended to the throne in 
early 2015 and embarked on a much more 
assertive foreign policy focused on rolling 
back perceived Iranian inroads into the 
Arab region. Alongside stronger engage-
ment in Syria, the most dramatic shift was 
the Saudi-led intervention in the civil war 
in Yemen, leading to sharp attacks on the 
Kingdom by Hizbullah leader Hassan Nas-
rallah in March 2015, and equally sharp 
responses from Riyadh and pro-Saudi media 
outlets. Already back then, it was being in-
sinuated that the Kingdom might reconsider 
a major donation for the LAF pledged by 
the late King Abdallah. The war of words es-
calated further after Saudi Arabia executed 
the prominent cleric and leader of its own 
Shiite minority, Nimr al-Nimr, on January 
2, 2016. This prompted Nasrallah to predict 
the downfall of the Saudi dynasty and ex-
plicitly accuse Riyadh of sponsoring jihadi 
terrorist groups. 
What finally broke the camel’s back was 
Lebanon’s refusal to sign up to a condem-
nation – adopted by the Arab League on 
January 10 – of mob attacks against the 
Saudi embassy in Tehran in the wake of 
Nimr’s execution. On February 19, Saudi 
funding for the LAF and the ISF to buy equip-
ment in France to the tune of four billion 
dollars was canceled, with Saudi officials 
citing Lebanon’s failure to stand by the King-
dom in its rivalry with Tehran, and Hiz-
bullah’s domination over the Lebanese gov-
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ernment. Riyadh proceeded to mobilize its 
allies in the Gulf Cooperation Council to 
list Hizbullah as a terrorist entity and ban 
their citizens from traveling to Lebanon, 
amid rumors that scores of Lebanese expat-
riates living in the Gulf Countries would 
see their work contracts, and hence resi-
dencies, terminated within the year. 
Christian Realignment and 
Sunni Disarray 
Paradoxically, the effects of the Saudi push-
back against Hizbullah have been particu-
larly destructive for its main Lebanese 
client, the Future Movement. As Riyadh’s 
position against Hizbullah hardened, 
the balancing act of party leader Hariri 
between rhetorical solidarity with his ex-
ternal patron on the one hand, and prag-
matic cooperation with the party on the 
other, became increasingly untenable. 
To escape the dilemma and win back the 
initiative, Hariri embarked on a bold wager: 
By November 2015, he abandoned the (near-
ly hopeless) presidential candidacy of his 
ally, Lebanese Forces leader Samir Geagea, 
and endorsed instead Sulaiman Franjieh, 
a loyal ally of Hizbullah. 
Although counterintuitive at first glance, 
the scheme nevertheless looked compel-
ling: As president, Franjieh would certainly 
confirm the legitimacy of Hizbullah’s arms, 
thus reassuring the party on its most im-
portant policy concern, while relieving the 
prime minister he was going to appoint 
from the onus of that concession – from all 
available signs, Hariri expected to take on 
the job himself. Appointing Franjieh, who 
is the grandson of a former president and 
heir to a long line of influential Christian 
political figures, also appeared likely to 
draw support from Christian elites while 
confirming that the Christian Maronite 
president can only be elected with the ex-
plicit endorsement of the strongest Sunni 
party. Unlike Michel Aoun, Franjieh has 
only a small group of three members of par-
liament who owe him loyalty, making it 
unlikely that he could become an effective 
rival to the prime minister – which is a con-
cern among those Sunnis who fear a reversal 
of the gains achieved with the 1990 con-
stitution. 
Finally, Franjieh’s alliance with Hizbul-
lah could be attributed to the long-standing 
Arab-nationalist orientation of his family, 
and thus as a regrettable error, but for an 
honorable cause. Prying away such an ally 
from Iran’s proxy would instead work 
against Teheran’s persistent attempts to 
style itself as the true champion of Arab 
and Islamic causes, and label Saudi Arabia 
and its allies as American puppets. Finally, 
to Christians in Lebanon and the region, 
electing Franjieh could convey the message 
that, instead of pacts between the minori-
ties (which allegedly motivated Aoun’s 
alliance with Hizbullah, besides personal 
ambition) under Iranian auspices, their 
future lies with the (Sunni) majority and 
the pro-Western Arab regimes spearheaded 
by Riyadh. Thus, with his realignment, 
Hariri could hope to tempt Hizbullah and 
sow dissent between the party and its main 
Christian ally, while placating his main for-
eign ally and his own increasingly restive 
followers. All failing, the offer would at 
least place responsibility for the political 
vacuum squarely on Hizbullah for rejecting 
not only a candidate with undeniable pedi-
gree and consensus potential, but also a 
generous offer extended across the political 
aisle. 
But the calculation backfired badly. Hiz-
bullah, for its part, turned down the bait 
and stood by its pledge to Aoun. Worse, 
Hariri’s own Christian allies rebelled, with 
discarded presidential hopeful Samir Geagea 
officially switching sides and endorsing 
Aoun. The latter can now boast an even 
larger share of the Christian political forces 
aligned to support him, making it virtually 
impossible to come up with a plausible 
alternative. By August 2016, Hizbullah Sec-
retary General Hassan Nasrallah spelled out 
the deal he was prepared to endorse: the 
election of Michel Aoun for president, in 
return for endorsing Hariri as the new head 
of government. Worst of all, Hariri’s own 
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party started to disintegrate during the 
process. On February 21, 2016, Minister of 
Justice Ashraf Rifi resigned from govern-
ment in protest against the continued co-
operation with Hizbullah and the endorse-
ment of Franjieh. As an outspoken former 
head of the ISF, the major Sunni stronghold 
in the security sector, Rifi commands sig-
nificant support among followers of Future, 
who are exasperated with Hariri’s appease-
ment strategy. He proceeded to contest the 
municipal elections in his native Tripoli, 
roundly defeating the list formed by Hariri 
with local heavyweights. 
As the Future leader appeared to consider 
even further concessions – perhaps even 
yielding to Hizbullah’s insistence to impose 
Aoun after all – his party began showing 
further strain. In addition, Hariri’s increas-
ing financial difficulties – the “billionaire 
politician” has been unable to pay salaries 
to many of his employees – compounded 
the impression of a complete unraveling. 
According to the recent defector Ashraf Rifi, 
Hariri is politically “finished.” 
That Hariri’s political demise is being 
trumpeted by media known to be mouth-
pieces of Saudi Arabia fuels speculation as 
to whether Riyadh is intent on replacing 
Hariri with a new political force ready 
to confront Hizbullah more aggressively. 
Alternatively, Saudi Arabia may have 
adopted a strategy of diversifying its assets 
while shifting its focus on higher stakes 
elsewhere (Syria, Yemen). Statements from 
the Saudi ambassador (since recalled), in 
which he states his country will refrain 
from intervening in internal Lebanese af-
fairs as a matter of principle, are certainly 
disingenuous. Yet, for the moment, the 
lack of clear guidance from Riyadh has left 
Future without its Saudi compass and its 
leadership in disarray. 
With these realignments, by late Sep-
tember the needed majority to elect Michel 
Aoun as president appeared to be within 
reach, even over the objections of parts of 
the Future Movement. This, however, would 
have done very little to resolve the institu-
tional deadlock, and could have possibly 
made it even worse. According to the con-
stitution, once a new president is elected, 
the government is automatically consid-
ered to have been resigned. Michel Aoun’s 
first task would therefore have been to 
select a new (Sunni) prime minister – a mis-
sion impossible if his election were to alien-
ate the most moderate Sunni party, or let it 
fracture. 
Without a larger consensus over the next 
steps – how to form a new government, 
when to finally hold elections – the current, 
already nearly defunct government will 
likely have to limp on in a caretaker func-
tion, alongside a deadlocked and compro-
mised parliament; and after June 2017, pos-
sibly no parliament at all. Such unpromis-
ing prospects prompted the Speaker of Par-
liament, Nabih Berri, who is also the leader 
of the second Shiite party, Amal, to hinge 
the support of his group of 13 MPs for any 
candidate on a package deal that resolves 
all outstanding issues. Thus, by early Octo-
ber 2016, the debate was once more back 
to square one. 
Beyond the Stalemate 
Suspending political contention while co-
operating to maintain security and a mini-
mal level of governance may have been a 
workable strategy to tide the country over 
until a solution for Syria could be found. 
Yet, after more than three years, these sur-
vival strategies have reached a dead end, 
with the erosion of the last vestiges of po-
litical legitimacy being written on the wall. 
Paradoxically, unlike the last cycle of 
crisis 10 years ago, the current system break-
down is now being caused by the fact that 
internal Lebanese politics has fallen below 
the radar of regional and international 
actors. Maintaining a stable stalemate in 
the Lebanese backyard of the Syrian war 
serves the Saudi and Iranian war sponsors 
well enough. Western countries, in turn, 
are too absorbed with the Syrian catastro-
phe – in particular the influx of refugees – 
to offer more than occasional mediation 
for stopgap solutions. Their major concern 
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remains preserving Lebanon as a compara-
tively safe host country for the current up 
to 1.5 million Syrian refugees that still has 
sufficient state capacity to channel aid 
and prevent refugee vessels from sailing 
to Cyprus or other European shores. 
However, walking away from Lebanon 
because it cannot be fixed is only the flip-
side of trying to fix it by force – and may 
turn out to be equally destructive. Along 
the same lines, banking on the current 
inertia to persist until some unspecified 
turn in regional relations resolves the 
impasse ignores how deceptive the current 
level of “stability” in the eye of the regional 
storm really is. One major reason why 
Lebanon, until now, has been spared the 
worst consequences of its systemic paralysis 
is the fact that for the past four years, all 
attention of the warring parties has been 
focused on Syria and Iraq. So far, recruits 
for the jihadi cause have mostly left Leba-
non to join jihadi groups fighting elsewhere, 
just as Hizbullah has waged the war with 
the clients of Saudi Arabia and the United 
States next door rather than at home. The 
conflict potential that remained was man-
ageable through tacit understandings 
between Hizbullah, the LAF, and political 
actors with access to radical Sunni Islam-
ists. It remains far from clear whether the 
Lebanese security apparatus would hold 
up if regional developments were to reverse 
that trend. Contrary to common expecta-
tions, a partial “solution” for Syria (and 
there is little reason to expect that a com-
prehensive settlement may be available any-
time soon) may raise the stakes rather than 
clear the ground for a compromise. For 
instance, if groups such as the so-called 
Islamic State or the former Jabhat al-Nusra 
were to be forced out of parts of Syria and 
Iraq, and large numbers of battle-hardened 
jihadi fighters were to pour across the bor-
der, they could well overwhelm the LAF and 
impose control in Sunni-dominated areas, 
in particular the impoverished north. Al-
though Hizbullah may have the military 
wherewithal to engage the jihadis, doing so 
in Sunni core areas would be a guaranteed 
recipe to ignite a full-fledged sectarian war. 
Already a marked rise in terrorist attacks 
would be enough to initiate the formation 
of proto-militias in the guise of local pro-
tection units, as divided politicians and 
paralyzed institutions are unlikely to gen-
erate a coherent security response that 
inspires trust across the sectarian divides. 
Under such kinds of pressure, the remnants 
of the Lebanese state that now mostly run 
on inertia will quickly unravel. 
What Role for the EU and Germany? 
For the EU and Germany, preempting such 
a scenario must be a priority. Lebanon hosts 
more up to 1.5 million Syrian refugees, 
many of whom will likely attempt to reach 
Europe if the security and economic situa-
tions in the country deteriorate. So far, 
attempts by European actors such as France 
and Great Britain to mediate behind the 
scenes have achieved little traction. Given 
the multilayered character of the conflict 
and the external entanglement of its main 
protagonists, it is unlikely that additional 
efforts along these lines can achieve better 
results. Germany and the EU should step 
into the gap left by Saudi Arabia and replace 
some of the funding for the LAF, which 
would have translated into commissions 
for European companies anyway. However, 
such support should not be tied to unreal-
istic expectations of the LAF creating a 
counterbalance to Hizbullah, as any such 
attempt would almost certainly lead to the 
disintegration of the force. Rather, the LAF 
is the only line of defense Lebanon has 
against the threat of armed jihadism, which 
it will have to face sooner rather than later. 
Western actors should instead come to terms 
with the reality that Hizbullah will remain 
an entrenched player on the Lebanese po-
litical scene and that it has to be a part of 
any attempt to solve the political and insti-
tutional crisis. This basic fact will not be 
changed by labeling the party as a terrorist 
organization or similar rhetorical exercises. 
Yet, effective partners in the other camps 
are equally indispensable. Although the 
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creation of a second Sunni party would 
not necessarily be a bad thing, the current 
state of fragmentation and failing leader-
ship within the Future Movement is a 
serious obstacle to finding a way out of the 
stalemate. A complete unraveling of the 
party would also make it even more diffi-
cult to stem the influence of jihadism at 
the more radical fringes of the Sunni com-
munity. By all available signs, the internal 
crisis of the Future Movement cannot be 
resolved without a clear votum from its 
regional patron, Saudi Arabia. This does 
not imply that Europe should lean back 
and wait. Future has established a far-flung 
network of relationships with European 
partners, among them the German political 
foundations. Now would be the time to 
offer mediation and other forms of support 
to stabilize this crucial political actor. 
Finally, restoring a basic level of legiti-
macy that can stem institutional erosion 
cannot be achieved without finally holding 
the parliamentary elections that have 
already been postponed twice. Following 
the municipal elections of May 2016, secu-
rity concerns are no longer a valid argu-
ment, if they ever were. Debate will in-
evitably return to the electoral law and the 
advantages that different ways to tweak 
the process and gerrymander the districts 
will offer to this or that side. There is, how-
ever, already a new electoral law that was 
designed in an extensive consultative pro-
cess some 10 years ago. By introducing a 
hybrid system that combines the traditional 
majority system with proportional repre-
sentation, the draft law may even make it 
possible that some contenders from outside 
the entrenched political elite – such as the 
citizens’ lists that did so well in the recent 
municipal elections – enter parliament. 
Either way, the experience of the past 
decade has shown that shifting a few seats 
from one camp to the other will not change 
the reality of the existing political divisions 
and power relations, and hence the need 
for continued consensus and cooperation 
between (relative) winners and losers. 
Whether the blocs around Hizbullah or 
Future will end up with a small majority 
in parliament, who that parliament elects 
as president, and who is appointed as com-
mander in chief of the LAF all remains of 
small importance compared to the resto-
ration of legitimate representation. 
External actors should thus impress on 
their Lebanese counterparts that no addi-
tional extension will be accepted. They 
should also make clear that political lead-
ers will no longer be considered legitimate 
representatives of Lebanon on international 
platforms before elections take place. 
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